



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



013 702 328 3 



reported, chiefly intended for the Burnside ex- 
pedition, but all under the command of Gen- 
eral McClellan. During the months of Octo- 
ber, November, and December, the weather 
wa3 delightful and the roads fine. The question 
began to be asked in October, when will the 
advance take place ? All bad the most unbound- 
ed confidence in the army and its young gen- 
eral, and were anxiously waiting for a Napole- 
onic stroke. It came, but such a stroke! That 
a general movement was being prepared the 
whole country had known for weeks ; but when 
the terrific blow was to be struck no one knew 
save the commander of the array of the Poto- 
mac. The nation believed in its young com- 
mander ; the President relied upon him, and 
all, myself included, had the most unbounded 
confidence in the result of the intended move 
ment. It came. On the 21st of October, 
McCall's division, twelve thousand strong, was 
ordered to Drainesville upon a reconnoissance. 
Smith's division, twelve thousand strong, was 
ordered to support him. McCall's reconnois- 
sance extended four miles beyond Drainesville, 
and to within nine miles of Leesburg. Stone, 
on Sunday, was informed of McCall's and 
Smith's advance, and directed to make a slight 
demonstration upon Leesburg. How ? He 
could do it in but one way, and that was by 
crossing the river and moving upon it. 

According to the testimony of Colonel Lee, 
confirmed by Major Revere, of the twentieth 
Massachusetts, the following dispatch was sent 
from McClellan to Stone : 

October 20, 1861. 
General McClellan desires me to inform you 
that General McCall occupied Drainsville yester- 
day, and is still there. Will send out heavy re- 
connoissances to-day in all directions from that 
point. The general desires that you keep a good 
lookout upon Leesburg, to see if this movement 
has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a 
slight demonstration on your part would have 
the efiFect to move them. 

A. V. COLLUxM, 
Assistant Adjutant General, 

General McCall says : 

" General McClellan told me, when he gave 
' me the orders to march Saturday morning, that 
' thei-e were no confederate troops at Leesburg ; 
' that they had left tlicre several days before. On 
' my arrival at Drainsville, all the inhabitants 
' told me that the brigade at Leesburg had crossed 
' Goose creek, and returned to Manassas on Tues- 
' day. That was a thing clearly understood. We 
.' did not see a man on the Leesburg road. I as- 
' certained afterwards that Evans had sent back 
' his heavy baggage with a guard, and that body 
' crossing Goose creek gave rise to the report 
' that he had retired with his whole force. But 
' he was there at the time I was at Drainsville, 
' but I did not know it. Had I been ordered for- 
' ward, I have not the slightest doubt that I could 



' have defeated Evans, and captured his whole 
' command. But it certainly w'ould have been a 
' very delicate matter, because they could have 
' thrown up twenty or thirty thousand men from 
' Centreville, and cut off my retreat from Draias- 
' ville." 

In another place General McCall says : 

" At six o'clock, Monday morning, I reported 
' to him [General McClellan] that the engineers 
' whom I had consulted reported to me that they 
' would finish their work in two hours. I sent 
' that, express, to General McClellan at six o'clock. 
' I got his reply, dated eight o'clock, telling me to 
' return as soon as the work was finished. I got 
' his answer between nine and ten o'clock. I 
' ordered the troops then to be ready to move, 
' and as soon as the work was finished, I returned 
' to my camp under orders." 

Here are the orders given by General Stone 
on that occasion : 

Headquarters, Camp op Observation, 
PooLESViLLE, October 20, 1861, 10-J p. m. 
[Special Orders, No. — .] 

Colonel Devens will land opposite Harrison's 
Island with five companies of his regiment, and 
proceed to surprise the camp of the enemy dis- 
covered by Captain Philbrick in the direction of 
Leesburg. The landing and march will be effected 
with silence and rapidity. 

Colonel Lee, twentieth Massachusetts volun- 
treers, will, immediately after Colonel Devens's 
departure, occupy Harrison's Island with four 
companies of his regiment, and will cause the 
four-oared boat to be taken across the island to 
the point of departure of Colonel Devens. 

One company will be thrown across to occupy 
the heights on the Virginia shore, after Colonel 
Devens's departure, to cover his return. 

Two mountain howitzers will be taken silently 
up the tow-path, and carried to the opposite side 
of the island, under the orders of Colonel Lee. 

Colonel Devens will attack the camp of the 
enemy at daybreak, and having routed them, will 
pursue them as far as he deems prudent, and will 
destroy the camp, if practicable, before returning. 

He will make all the observations possible on 
the country ; will, under all circumstances, keep 
his command well in hand, and not sacrifice them 
to any supposed advantage of a rapid pursuit. 

Having accomplished this duty, Colonel Devens 
will return to his present position, unless he shall 
see one on the Virginia side nearer the river, 
which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, 
and one which can be successfully held against 
largely superior numbers. In such case, he will 
hold on and report. 

CHARLES P. STONE, 

Brigadier General. 

Great care will be used by Colonel Devens to 
prevent any unnecessary injury of private prop- 
erty; and any officer or soldier straggling from 
the command for curiosity or plunder will be in- 
stantlj' shot. 

CHARLES P. STONE, Brigadier General. 



6 



Headquarters Corps of Observation, 
Edwards's Ferry, October 21, 1801. 
Colonel: In case of heavy firing in front of 
Harrison's Island, you will advance the California 
reginaent of your brigade, or retire the regiments 
under Colonels Lee and Devens, now on the Vir- 
ginia side of the river, at your discretion, as- 
suming command on arrival. 

Very respectfully, colonel, vours, most kindly, 
CHARLES P. STONE, 

Brigadier Commanding. 
Colonel E. D. Baker, Commanding Brigade. 

Headquarters Corps of Observation, 
Edwards's Ffury, October 21, 11.50. 
Colonel : I am informed that the force of the 
enemy is about four thousand, all told. If you 
can push them you may do so as far as to have 
a strong position near Leesburg, if you can keep 
them before you, avoiding their batteries. If 
they pass Leesburg and take the Gum Springs 
road, you will not follow far, but seize the first 
good position to cover that road. Their design 
is to draw us on, if they are obliged to retreat, 
as far as Goose creek, where they can be rein- 
forced from Jfanassas. I have a strong position. 
Report frequently, so that when they are pushed 
Gorman can come in on their flank. 
Yours respectfully and truly, 

CHARLES >. STONE, 
Brigadier General Commandi)ig. 
Colonel E. D. Baker, Commanding Brigade. 

Thus it is shown that Colonel Baker had 
reason to expect reinforcements, for the enemy 
were to be pushed upon their flank by General 
Gorman. 

At two o'clock on Monday morning Colonel 
Devens crossed the river upon a reconnois- 
sance with four hundred men at Ball's Bluff, 
opposite Harrison's Island, a's directed by Gen- 
eral Stone. At daylight Colonel Baker was 
ordered to cross to the support of Colonel Dev- 
ens. I have read his orders. One scow and 
two small boats were their only means of trans- 
portation. At eight o'clock on Monday morn- 
ing the fight commenced by Colonel Devens, 
and Colonel Baker was placed in command, as 
is alleged, with discretionary orders. Colonel 
Baker knew that Smith and McCall were at 
Drainesville, or within striking distance; that 
our troops were crossing at Edwards's Ferry, or, 
►in other words, that forty thousand effective men 
were within twelve miles of him, and that at 
least thirty thousand were upon the Virginia 
side of the Potomac, and that in the nature oi 
things he must be reinforced. He did not 
know that at half-past ten a. m., of Monday, or 
two hours and a half after Colonel Devens com 
menced the light, the divisions of Smith and 
McCall commenced their retreat, by the ex- 
press orders of General McClellan. He knew 
that Colonel Devens was contending with greatly 
superior forces, and, like a gallant soldier as he 
was, he hastened to his relief with all the force 



he could take across with his inadequate means 
of transportation. 

Colonel Baker has been charged with impru- 
dence and rashness; but neither the facts nor 
the testimony support the charge. Instead of 
rashly or imprudently advancing into the ene- 
my's lines, as was alleged, he did not move ten 
rods from the Bluff, and the only sustaining 
witness to this charge was one officer, who 
swore that he thought Colonel Baker impru- 
dently exposed himself to the enemy's bullets. 
This kind of rashness is usually pardoned after 
the death of the perpetrator. At two o'clock, 
p. m.. Colonel Baker found himself in com- 
mand of about eighteen hundred men upon 
Ball's Bluff, including Devens's men and three 
guns, and the lighting commenced. The alter- 
natives were fight and conquer, however, or be 
captured. That noble band of heroes and their 
gallant commander understood these terrible 
alternatives as well upon that bloody field as 
we do now, and nobly did they vindicate their 
manhood. During all those long hours, from 
two o'clock p. m. until the early dusk of even- 
ing, the gallant Baker continued the unequal 
contest, when he fell pierced by three bullets 
and instantly expired. A council of war was 
called, (after the frightful death-struggle over 
his lifeless remains and for them,) and it was 
decided that the only chance of an escape was 
by cutting through the enemy and reaching 
Edwards's Ferry, which was at once decided 
upon ; but while forming for the desperate 
encounter, the enemy rushed upon our little 
band of heroes in overpowering numbers, and 
the rout was perfect. 

Colonel Devens says : 

" As we were talking. Colonel Cogswell came 
' up, and it appeared in a moment that he was 
' the officer entitled to take the command. Colonel 
' Cogswell said to me, ' Colonel Devens, we should, 
' I think, make an effort to cut our way to Ed- 
' wards's Ferry; that is the thing to be done.' I 
' replied to him as I had to Colonel Lee, that I 
' would take any orders of his." 

Colonel Lee says : 

"Captain Harvey, of Colonel Baker's staff, his 
adjutant general, came up, and said that he be- 
lieved that Colonel Cogswell was the senior of- 
ficer. Colonel Cogswell was a stranger to me ; 
I knew he was on the field ; but whether he was 
ray senior or I his, was a question I would not 
determine there. But, as Captain ILirve^y stated 
it confidently, I accepted it as a fact; for it 
was no time to dis])ute about rank on a field of 
battle like that. I sai<l, 'Very well; what are 
your orders?' 'I think,' said Colonel Cogs-* 
well, ' that we better try to cut our way through 
the enemy to the left, and reach Edwards's Fer- 
ry, ' which is from two and a half to three miles 
distant from where we were." 

Major John Mix, third Now York cavalry, 
sajs, in answer to the question: 




" What number of men would have driven off 
' the enemy at Ball's Bluff if you had gone up ? 

'^ Answer. I think almost any number would, 
' because Ave would have attacked them on their 
' flank and rear. I think twenty-five men would 
' have scared them oS', for being in the woods, 
' and coming right out upon them, they would 
' have thought there was something terrific com- 

' ing. 

" Question. How many men had you over there 
' (Edwards's Ferry) at the time you wanted to go 
' up to Ball's Bluff? 

" Answer. I think not over fourteen hundred 
' men." 

General Stone says, (first testimony :) 

" Now, here at Edwards's Ferry is Goose creek, 
' (indicating on the map.) Here is an entrench- 
' ment of the enemy on the road to Leesburg, 
' and there is another entrenchment in there, (in- 
' dicating the places.) This is wooded ground 
' along here, (above the ferry on the Virginia 
' side.) When this fire commenced heavilj^ on 
' our right in the afternoon, these troops of the 
' left would have gone up, as a matter of course, 
' had it not been fully explained in the morning 
' that that was an impossibility, there being two 
' entrenchments of the enemy here armed with 
' cannon. It was known beforehand that they 
' were there." * -x- * * 

" Question. They could not go directly up on 
' account of these batteries? 

" Answer. No, sir ; and that was known and 
' explained to Colonel Baker before he started." 
* * * * * 

" Question. What was the strength of those 
' batteries ? 

" Anszver. They were within the woods, and 
' we could not tell what they were ; they might 
' be very weak or very strong. All I knew about 
' them was, that they were in the woods, and 
' that they had open spaces for the guns to play, 
' and I knew there were three guns there." 

, Major Mix says, in answer to the question: 

" Question. Were there any fortifications be- 
' tween the two places that would have ob- 
' structed you ? 

" Ansioer. Yes, sir ; there was an earthwork 
' on a hill, some three and a half feet wall, which 
' did not amount to much. If I had not met 
' that regiment, it was my intention to gallop 
' through that work. 

" Question. Were there any guns in it ? 

" Ansiver. I was informed by General Stone 
' that there was not. He said the guns had been 
' moved out a day or two before. I asked him if 
' I could go through it, and he said I might if it 
' was not held too strongly." * * * 

" Question. Would it have impeded your going 
'up there? Did he (General Stone) think it 
' would? 

" Answer. No, sir ; I do not think it did. 

" Question. He thought there were a thousand 
men with three guns in the way ? 

" Answer. I only heard that statement about 



' the regiment and three guns about three or four 
' weeks ago." 

This testimony was taken February 14, 18G2. 
Stone's first testimony was taken January 5, 

1862. 

" In a conversation with General Stone, I was 
' regretting that we had not moved up, and he 
' said we could not have got there for that rea- 
' son. 

" Question. Did you know at the time of any 
' obstruction to your going up there ? 

" Ansiver. No, sir." 

Major Dimmick testifies : 

'• Question. When did you go up to this breast- 
' work ? 

" Answer. I went up there AVednesday morn- 
' ing a little before day, just at break of day. I 
' think there were men inside ; we could see fig- 
' ures moving, but we could not tell whether 
' they were armed or not. The day before, during 
' the skirmish, men were seen there throwing up 
' earth. It was, evidently, veiy hastily con- 
' structed, nothing but a very simple earthwork 
' running across the road, perhaps forty paces 
' long. 

" Question. Would you have considered that at 
' that time any impediment to the march of in- 
' fautry ? 

" Answer. Not at all; hardly more than if you 
' should turn this table upon its side, and put 
' some men behind it. The boys were so anxious 
' to go that they would hardly wait for the order 
' to go." 

Colonel Tompkins testifies : 

" Question. Were there any obstacles in the 
' way of your going up to Ball's Bluff? 

" Answer. None at all. No doubt we would 
' have had to fight a little on our way up. But 
' I think by going up that way, on that side, we 
' would have drawn their attention towards us, 
' and engaged them so that Colonel Baker's forces 
' would have had an opportunity to have got a 
' better foothold than they had. He had a hor- 

' ribly bad jjlace to cross there." 

***** 

" Question. Did you see any batteries, or any- 
' thing of that kind, that would have prevented 
' your going up to Ball's Bluff? 

" Ansicer. No, sir ; I did not. We did not re- 
' ceive any fire from any batteries." 

Philip Haynes testifies : 

" Question. Are you acquainted with the ground 
' on the Virginia side between Edwards's Ferry 
' and Ball's Bluff? 

" Answer. Certainly, I think I ought to be. I 
' have been up and down there a great many 
' times. 

" Question. Is there any difficulty in the way 
' of men passing from Edwards's Ferry to Ball's 
' Bluff on the Virginia side ? 

" Answer. I should think not. 

" Question. Are there any fortifications there 
' that you know of? 



8 



^^ Answer. It was reported that there was a lit- 
' tie embankment there, but the men would not 
' require to go withiu a half mile of that to go to 
' Ball's Bluff. 

" Question. Were there any guns mounted 
' there ? 

^'Answer. I never heard of any." * * * 

" Question. There was no obstacle to infantry 
' marching right up? 

" Ansirer. None at all, except right on the bluff 
' by the river. The land is rolling there as it is 
' about Chain Bridge ; but after you get from the 
' river about an eighth of a mile it is perfectly 
' accessible for infantry." 

General Stone says, (second examination :) 

" Question. They have no guns to canuonadje 
' with except west of Leesburg? 

" Answer. None at all that are in position, nor 
' have they had any at any time. According to 
' the last information which I obtained, they had 
' three field guns that moved from point to point ; 
' those field guns they move about." 

How many were killed in battle, how many 
drowned in the relentless river, will never be 
correctly known ; suffice it to aay our little 
force were destroyed. Why was this little band 
permitted to be destroyed by a force little more 
than double its numbers in presence of forty 
thousand splendid troops ? Why were McCall 
and Smith ordered back at the very moment 
that Baker was ordered to cross ? If we want- 
ed Leesburg, McCall could have taken it with- 
out the loss of a man, as his movement in 
mass had already caused its evacuation, and 
the enemy did not return in force until after 
McCall had retreated. If we did not wish to 
capture Leesburg, why did we cross at all? Of 
what use is a slight demonstration, even with- 
out results ? These are questions which the 
people will a.sk, and no man can satisfactorily 
answer. Why were not reinforcements sent 
from Edwards's Ferry to Colonel Baker ? The 
distance was only three miles and a half. We 
had fifteen hundred men across at two o'clock 
on Monday, and the universal concurrent tes- 
timony of officers ani men is that a reinforce- 
ment of even one thousand men — some say five 
hundred, and one gallant captain swears that 
with one hundred men he could have struck 
them upon the Hank, and changed the result 
of the day. Why, 1 say, were not these rein- 
forcements sent ? Stone swears, as I have al- 
ready shown, that there were batteries between 
Edwards's Ferry and Ball's Bluff which would 
have utterly destroyed any force he could have 
sent to Baker's relief, and that Baker knew it. 
But Stone was not sustained by a single wit- 
ness ; on the contrary, all swear that there 
were not, to their knowledge, and that they did 
not believe there were any, and a civilian liv- 
ing upon the spot, and in the habit of passing 
over the ground frequently, swears there were 
none. And again, Stone, when questioned as 



to the erection of forts under the range of his 
guns, upon his second examination, swears 
positively that there is not a gun now between 
Edwards's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, and never has 
been. Why, then, were not reinforcements 
sent from Edwards's Ferry ? Let the men who 
executed and planned this horrible slaughter 
answer to God and an outraged country. Gen- 
eral Banks swears that his orders were such 
from General McClellao, that upon bis arrival 
at Edwards's Ferry, although his judgment was 
against crossing, he did not feel himself at lib- 
erty to decline crossing, and he remained upon 
the Virginia side until Thursday. 
General Banks sweats: 

" Question. One question in relation to the 
' crossing. You said that General Gorman 
' thought it not advisable for our forces to cross. 
' General Lander thought it was, and you felt 
' constrained to adopt General Lander's view. 
' Do you mean that you felt constrained in con- 
' sequence of instructions or orders ? 

" Answer. I concurred with General Lander 
' on account of my instructions. But then it 
' was not an affair that I should have planned 
' myself at that time. 

" Question. You took your instructions from 
' General McClellan? 

" Ansii-er. My instructions from General Mc- 
' Clellan were to cross the river, and I did so as 
' far as was practicable. The difficulty was that 
' we had no transportation to make it safe." 

So much for the wholesale murder at Ball's 
Bluff. 

[Five o'clock having arrived, the Senate took 
a recess until seven, p. m.] 



Mr. CHANDLER. After the melancholy 
disaster at Ball's Bluff, our army of the Poto- 
mac, of over one hundred and fifty thousand 
men, retired at all points except directly in 
front of Washington, where it remained sta- 
tionary for many months. The last of October 
the Navy Department applied to the military 
for four thousand men to hold Matthias Point 
after the enemy should have been shelled from 
it by the gunboats, and thus break open the 
navigation of the Potomac, a military as well 
as national necessity. 

Assistant Secretary Fox testifies : 

" Question. Do you know of an attempt having 
' been made, or a project formed, to take posses- 
' sion of Matthi.as Point at any time ? If so, 
' will 3"ou state the particulars? 

" Anstcer. The Navy Department, as early as 
' in June last, (18G1,)' proposed to the War De- 
' partment to take possession of that point, and 
' an examination was made by the War Depart- 
' ment with reference to the project, by Captain 
' Woodbury, of the engineers, and Captain Pal- 
' mer, of the topographical engineers. The War 
' Department, or General Scott, declined to send 
' a force down there as early as June. Captain 



9 



* Ward sent up a very urgent request, just before 
' lie was killed, asking for only three hundred 
' men to occupy that point, and General Scott 

* consented to allow three hundred men to go ; 
' but General JIansfield thought that there ought 
' to be as many as five thousand, and it fell 
» through probably on that account, though Gen- 
' eral Mansfield was very earnest and very posi- 
' tive in his opinion that that point ought to be 

* occupied in force. 

" Mr. Welles went over to see General Scott 
' about it, I think in June, and pressed it upon 
' him personally as well as by letter. The first 
' official letter that I find upon our books was 
' written on the 1st day of July. It is as follows, 
' addressed to Mr. Cameron : 

" 'Navy Department, July 1, 1861. 

" ' Sir : I have the honor to inform you that 
' this Department is entirely satisfied, from re- 
' ports of its oflicers, that the Potomac river will 
' soon be closed by the batteries of the rebels, 
' unless one or more important points are occu- 
' pied by the Federal troops.' 

" Then Bull Run intervened between that and 
' the next one which I find upon our books, 
' which is dated August 20, 1861, to Mr. Came- 
' ron from Mr. Welles. It is as follows : 

'' 'Navy Department, August 20, 1861. 
" ' Sir : The importance of keeping open the 
' laavigation of the Potomac is so obvious that 
' no argument is necessary upon the subject. So 
' far as is possible this Department has, and will 
' continue to discharge its duty in this matter by 
' an armed flotilla. But there are one or two 
' points where shore batteries can be made to in- 
' tercept communication, and in view of that dan- 
' ger and recent investigations, I would most ur- 
' gently request that immediate measures be ta- 
' ken by the War Department to fortify and in- 
' crench Matthias Point. A single regiment, 
' aided by two of our steamers, could heretofore, 
' and perhaps may still, take possession and se- 

* cure it. But if more than a regiment is re- 
' quired, it appears to rne indispensable that the 

* requisite number should be furnished. 

" ' Attention, on repeated occasions, has been 
' called to the particular necessity of holding 
' that place as absolutelj'- essential to the unre- 
' stricted navigation of the Potomac. The navy 
' will at any moment contribute its efforts to- 
' wards seizing and holding that place, and I 
' apprehend there need not be any delay. Can- 
' net a suflicient force be sent down forthwith to 
' seize, and in connection with such armed ves- 
' sels as we can order, hold Matthias Point, and 
' thus keep open the navigation of the Potomac? 

" ' I understand that troops will be sent to the 
' lower Maryland counties to keep the peace and 
' prevent batteries from being erected on the left 
' bank. This is a timely and wise precaution. 
' But it is equally necessary that we should take 

* possession of Matthias Point. Should the in- 

* surgents get possession of that point it would 
' require a very large force to dispossess them.' 

" On the 31st of August I find the following 



' letter from the Navy Department to the War 
' Department: 

'"August 31, 1861. 

" ' Sir : I have the honor to enclose copies of 
' dispatches received from Captain Craven, in 
' command of the Potomac flotilla, and beg leave 
' to call your attention to his suggestions of the 
' necessity of prompt and efficient measures for 
' keeping open the navigation of the Potomac. 
' I have heretofore, on repeated occasions, called 
' the attention of the War Department to this 
' subject, which is of immense importance to this 
' city, and the operations of the array as well 
' as of the navy. It appears to me there should 
' be no delay in taking the precautionary steps 
' recommended by Captain Craven ; and this De- 
' partment, with the uaval force in the Potomac, 
' is ready at all time? to aid in this measure.' 

" Nothing, however, was done at that time. 

" In October there were in the Potomac the 
' Pawnee, the Pocahontas, and the Seminole, 
' three very heavily armed vessels, and the R. B. 
' Forbes, with two very formidable guns on board. 
' These vessels were detailed to go with Dupout's 
' expedition to Port Royal ; but before they went 
' the Navy Department proposed to the President 
' and to the War Department tiiat the rebel bat- 
' teries that had then begun to appear upon the 
' river should be destroyed, and their places oc- 
' cupied by the army. It was urged that these 
' were the heaviest ships that we had in the river, 
' and that we must withdraw them for this south- 
' eru expedition, as ships were too scarce to allow 
' them to remain here iu the river doing nothing. 
' And an effort was made to get the army to co- 
' operate with us, or, rather, to premit us to co- 
' operate with the army. 

" They agreed to send down four thousand men 
' to take possession just above Matthias Point. 
' This was some time in October. I do not find 
' any written communication upon our books in 
' regard to it ; but I can get the exact date, if 
' necessary. The orders were sent down from 
' the Navy Department to Captain Craven and 
' Captain Dahlgren, and scows and steamers 
' were provided for carrying the troops and land- 
' ing them at Matthias Point. Cajjiain Craven 
' collected at Matthias Point all the boats of his 
' flotilla, and we notified him that four thousand 
' men would arrive there in the middle of the 
' night. Those troops did not go. The first in- 
* timation wc had of that was a tug-boat sent up 
' the next day, from Captain Craven, with word 
' that the troops had not come. 

" I went over to see the President about it, and 
' we went over to see General McClellan. He 
' told us that the engineers were of the opinion 
' that troops could not be landed in such large 
' numbers, and they had concluded not to send 
' them. I told him that the business of landing 
' the troops belonged to the navy, and that we 
' had the means provided for it, and that nobody 
' had inquired of us whether we could land them 
' or not. It was then concluded that they should 
' go the next night, and we sent down word to 
' Captain Craven to be prepared the next night, 



16 



' but the next night they did not go. They never 

* went ; and Ave never Icnew what the reason 

* was. 

" We then sent our boats out of the river. We 
' told the President, who was exceedingly earnest 
' upon the subject, that the election had been 
' made that the river should be closed; that we 
' had done our part, and that we had nothing 
' further to do ; that wc had the vessels and could 

* destroy the batteries, but the vessels would be 

* of no use here if that w.as not done, and it would 

' be of no use to destroy the batteries if they were j 
' not occupied by our troops. We told him that 
' these vessels, as he very well knew, must go 
' down to Port Royal. They were of very light 
' draft, very powerful, and tlieir machinery was 

* covered. They accordingly went out, one after 

* another." * * * * 

" I have heard a great matiy reasons assigned 
' for this course, as I have gathered them from 
' conversations. General McClellan thought it 
' would bring on a general engagement to at- 
' tempt to move there. The engineers were un- 
' der the impression that the proper way to carry 
' those batteries was to march down the river. 
' The President assisted the Navy Department as 
' far as he could in urging this plan upon Gen- 
' eral McClellan. And he manifested more feel- 
' ing and more disappointment than I have seen 
' him before exhibit, when he found the men had 
' not gone. 

" Question. General McClellan objected to fur- 
' nishing the men? 

^'■Answer. General Scott commenced. 

" Question. But afterwards General McClellan 

* objected? 

" Answer. Yes, sir; it was continued by him." 

Mr. WRIGHT. I desire to ask the Senator 
from Michigan a question. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Certainly. 

Mr. WRIGHT. The Senator seems to be 
presenting testimony taken before the commit- 
tee on the conduct of the war. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WRIGHT. I desire to know whether 
it is presented at the instance of the commit- 
tee? 

Mr. CHANDLER. Y'ea, sir; by a vot§ of 
the committee. 

Mr. WRIGHT. I am a member of the com- 
mittee, and I was not aware of it. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Afrer consultation, it 
was agreed by General McClellan that four 
regiments should be furnished, and the time 
was fixed for their embarkation. At the ap 
pointed time the vessels were ready, steam up 
and transports alongside, and thus they re- 
mained all night, but no troops appeared. 
Upon inquiry as to the cause, the General-in- 
Chief informed the Secretary of the Navy that 
he did not send the troops b>^cau3e he feared 
the arrangements for landing were not perfected. 
The Secretary of the Navy informed him that 
•when the navy and army cooperated, it was 
the duty of the navy to provide boats for land- 



ing, and that ample provision had been made; 
whereupon, that night was fixed upon as the 
time to embark the troops. Again the boats 
were in readiness, steam up, and the gallant 
sailors and marines eager for the frav, but 
again were they disappointed. The troops did 
not arrive ; whereupon the Navy Department 
informed the War Department that it consid- 
ered the refusal to furnish troops a virtual aban- 
donment of the Potomac to the rebel blockade ; 
that the vessels were required for the southern 
expedition, and would at once be sent to their 
destination ; and thus for months was the na- 
tion disgraced by the blockade of its capital, 
and many millions of dollars wasted in expens- 
ive transportation, which a small force judi- 
ciously posted might have prevented. Mr. 
Fox, in answer to the question whether this 
small force would be safe on Matthias Point, 
replied, "Certainly; our vessels can shell the 
Point upon both sides for a long distance." 
Why was this disgrace so long submitted to ? 
No man knows or attempts to explain. Month 
after month one of the most splendid armies 
the world had ever seen, of two hundred thou- 
sand men, permitted itself and the national 
capital to be besieged by a force never exceed- 
ing one-half its own number. 

During the month of December, the nation 
became impatient. The time had arrived and 
passed when we were promised a forward move- 
ment. The roads were good, the weather splen- 
did, the army in high condition, and eager for 
the fray. How long the roads and weather 
would permit the movement, no man could pre- 
dict ; still there was no movement. The gen- 
erals, with great unanimity, declared that the 
army had reached its maximum of proficiency 
as volunteers, but still there was no movement. 
Under these circumstances, the committee on 
the conduct of the war asked an interview with 
the President and Cabinet, and urged that the 
winter should not be permitted to pass without 
action, as it would lead to an incalculable loss 
of life and treasure by forcing our brave troops 
into a summer campaign, in a hot and to them 
inhospitable climate. The President and Cab- 
inet were united in the desire that an immedi- 
ate advance should be made, but it was not 
made, although we were assured by General 
McClellan that it would be very soon ; that he 
had no intention of going into winter quarters, 
and he did not. While the enemy erected com- 
fortable huts at Centreville and Manassas for 
their winter quarters, our brave ar.d eaijer troops 
spent the most uncomfortable winter ever knswn 
in this climate, under canvas, as thousands and 
tens of thousands of invalid .soldiers throughout 
the length and breadth of the land will attest. 
Why did not the army move in all Dec-^mber, 
or why did it not go into winter quarters ? No 
man knows, nor is any reasou assigned. 

On the 1st day of January, 18G2, and for 
months previous to that date, the armies of the 



11 



Republic were occupying a purely defensive 
position upon the whole line from Missouri to 
the Atlantic, until on or about the 27rh of Jan 
nary the President and Secretary of War issued 
the order Jvrward. Then the brave Foote took 
the initiative, soliciting two thousand men from 
Halleck to hold Fort Henry after he had cap- 
tured it with his gunboats. They were promptly 
furnished, and Henry fell; then Douelson, with 
its fifteen thousand prisoners; then Newbern; 
and the country was electrified. Credit was 
given where credit was due. Do-nothing strat- 
egy gave way to an immediate advance upon 
the enemy's works, and the days of spades and 
pickaxes seemed to be ended. On the 22d of 
February a forward movement upon our whole 
line was ordered, but did not take place. The 
army of the Potomac was not ready; but on the 
10th of March it moved, against the protest of 
the commanding general and eight out of twelve 
of the commanders of divisions; but the Presi- 
dent was inexorable, and the movement must 
be made. It proceeded to Ceutreville, and 
there found deserted huts, wooden artillery, and 
intrenchments which could and can be success- 
fully charged by cavalry. It proceeded to Ma- 
nassas, and found no fortifications worthy of the 
name, a deserted, abandoned camp, and dead 
horses for trophies. The enemy, less than forty 
thousand men, had leisurely escaped, carrying 
away all his artillery, baggage, array, and stores. 
Our army of the Potomac, on that 10th day of 
March, showed by its muster roll a force of two 
hundred and thirty thousand men. Comment 
is needless. The grand army of the Potomac 
proceeded towards Gordonsville, found no en- 
emy, repaired the railroad, and then marched 
back again. 

Why this grand army of the Potomac did not 
march upon Richmond has never been satisfac- 
torily explained, and probably never will be. 
One reason assigned was lack of transporta- 
tion; but there were two railroads, one by way 
of Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg, the other 
via Manassas and Gordonsville, which could 
have been repaired at the rate of ten miles per 
day, and our army was ample to guard it. Had 
this overwhelming force proceeded directly to 
Richmond by these lines, it would have spent 
the 1st day of May in Richmond, and ere this 
the rebellion would have been ended. This 
giand army, abh/ commanded, was superior to 
any army the world has seen for five hundred 
years. Napoleon I never fought one hundred 
and thirty thausand men upon one battle field. 
Yet this noble army was divided and virtually 
sacrificed by some one. Who is the culprit? 

Before the advance upon Manassas, General 
McClellan changed his plans, and demanded to 
be permitted to leave the enemy intrenched at 
Centreville and Manassas, to leave the Poto- 
mac blockaded, and to take his army to An- 
napolis by land, and there embark them for the 
rear of the enemy to surprise him. In the I 



council of war called upon this proposition, 
the commanding general and eight out of 
twelve of the commanders of divisions (and 
here permit me to say that I am informed that 
seven of the eight generals were appointed upon 
the recommendation of General McClellan) 
voted that it was not safe to advance upon the 
wooden guns of Centrevilln, and to adopt the 
new plan of campaign. The President and 
the Secretary of War overruled this pusillani- 
mous decision, and compelled McClellan to 
" move immediately upon the enemy's works." 
He marched, and the trophies of that memo- 
rable campaign are known to the Senate and 
the country. 

At Fairfax, General McClellan changed his 
plan and decided not to advance upon the 
rebels with his whole force, but to return to 
Alexandria, divide his army, and embark for 
Fortress Monroe and Yorktown. It was deci- 
ded that forty-five thousand men should bele-ft 
for the defence of the capital, and he was per- 
mitted to embark. After much delay (unavoid- 
able in the movement of so vast a force, with 
its enormous material) the general-in-chief him- 
self embarked. Soon after he sailed it came 
to the knowledge of the committee on the con- 
duct of the war that the capital, with its vast 
accumulation of material of war, had been left 
by General McClellan virtually without defence, 
and the enemy's whole force, large or small, 
was untouched in front. The committee im- 
mediately summoned General Wadsworth, the 
commanding general and military governor of 
the District, who, upon oath, made part of his 
testimony the following statement to the Sec- 
retary of War : 

HEADQUAKTERa MlLrTAET DISTRICT OP WASHiyGTOy, 

Washington, D. C, April 2, 1862. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit the following 
condensed statement of the forces under my com- 
mand for the defences of Washington : 

Infantry 15,335 

Artillery 4.294 

Cavalry (six companies not mounted) 848 

20,4^7 
Deduct sick and in arrest and con- 
finement 1,455 



Total present for duty 19,022 



I have no mounted light artillery under my 
command. Several companies of the reserve 
artillery of the Potomac are still here, but not 
under my command or fit for service. 

Of this force I am ordered by General McClel- 
lan to detail two regiments (good ones) to join 
Richardson's division (Sumner's corps) as it 
passes through Alexandi'ia; one regiment to re- 
place the thirty-seventh New York volunteers in 
Heintzelman's old division, and one regiment to 
relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's 
Ferry ; total, four regiments. 

I am further ordered this morning by telegraph 



1 



to send four thousand men to relieve General 
Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton, that he 
may embark forlhwith. 

In regard to the character and efficiency of the 
troops under my command, I have to state that 
nearly all the force is new and imperfectly dis- 
ciplined ; that several of the regiments are in a 
very disorganized condition from various causes 
■which it is not necessary to state here. Several 
regiments having been relieved from brigades 
which have gone into the field, in consequence 
of their unfitness for service, the best regiments 
remaining have been selected to take their place. 

Two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry 
regiment, which had been drilled for some months 
in artillery service, have been withdrawn from 
the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and 
I have only been able to fill their place with very 
new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted 
■with the duties of that arm, and of little or no 
value in their present position. 

I am not informed as to the position which 
Major General Banks is directed to take, but at 
this time he is, as I understand, on the other 
side of the Bull Run mountains, leaving my com- 
mand to cover the front from Manassas Gap 
(about twenty miles beyond Manassas) to Acquia 
Creek. 

I deem it my duty to state that, looking at the 
numerical strength and character of the force 
under my command, it is, in my judgment, en- 
tirely inadequate to, and unfit for, the important 
duty to which it is assigned. I regard it very 
improbable that the enemy will assail us at this 
point; but this belief is based upon the hope 
that tiiey may be promptly engaged elsewhere, 
and may not learn the number and character of 
the force left here. 

I have the honor to be your obedient servant, 
JAMES S. WADSWORTII, 
Bricjadier General and ililitarij Governor. 

Hon. Skcretary of War. 

I will here state that no man has a higher 
regard for General Wadsworth than myself. I 
know him well, and esteem him highly ; but I 
must be permitted to say that his soldierly sim- 
plicity exceeds belief. His only hope of impu- 
nity from attack is that the enemy will not know 
his force, and will speedily be engaged else- 
where. By whom and where? Not certainly 
by the army under General McClellau, for he 
had already learned that McClellau never at- 
tacked. By whom and where? I again ask. 
General Wadsworth must answer. One hun 
dred and twenty thousand men were lauded at 
Fortress Monroe, aud sat down before York- 
town under General McClellau, while the enemy 
at that time did not reach ten thousand men. 
Instantly General McClellan began to telegraph 
for reinforcements, and continued to telegraph 
up to the day he was attacked by the rebels. 
The country has been deceived as to McClei- 
lan'a force, and has been led to believe it was 
inadequate. Jolin Tucker, Assistant Secretary 
of War, procured transportation aud superin- 



tended the shipment of all the troops and rein- 
forcements. He testified as follows : 

" Question. What is your position under the 
' Government? 

" Answer. I am Assistant Secretary of War. 

" Question. Do you know anything about the 
' transportation of troops to Yorktown and, the 
' peninsula? 

" Answer. I do. I attended to the embarka- 
' tion of those troops. 

" Question. Of the whole of them? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. 

" Question. Can you state what number of 
' troops were first embarked for that jjlace? 

" Answer. Prior to the fifth of April, as I know 
' from the statements made to me by the quar- 
' termasters who were attending to the details, 
' there were one hundred and twenty-one thou- 
' sand five hundred men. 

" Question. That was before General Franklin's 
' division was ordered there ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. Shortly after that Frank- 
' lin's division ■was shipped; it numbered twelve 
' thousand men. About the first of June McCall's 
' division was sent down there; it consisted of 
' ten thousand men. And about the same time, 
' from Baltimore and Fort Monroe there were sent 
' eleven thousand men ; and the last of June a 
' part of Shields's division were shipped. I did 
' not superintend that, but I am informed there 
' were about five thousand of them. 

" Question. You superintended the shipment 
' of all the troops but those from General Shields's 
' division-? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. 

" Question. Does that comprise all that has 
' been sent to General McClellan since he landed 
' there ? 

" Answer. That is all that I know of. 

" Question. That includes the number sent by 
' Generals Wool and Dix? 

'' Answer. Yes, sir. That makes one hundred 
' and fifty thousand men in all. 

" Question. Do you know of any other forces 
' at the disposal of the Government that could 
' have been spared for his assistahce? 

" Answer. I do not. 

" Question. Were there reasons why General 
' McDoweirs forces could not be sent ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. The President deemed 
' them essential for the protection of Washing- 
' ton. 

" Question. And that force was none too strong 
' for the defence of this place? 

" Answer. It was so regarded. 

" Question. Have you any personal knowledge 
' of the state of the roads and the condition of the 
' country on the peninsula when General M.C- 
' Clellan first took his army there? 

" Answer. Early in April I visited the head- 
' quarters of General McClellan, and found the 
' roads totally impassable for the transportation 
' of artillery, and almost so for supplies. On my 
' arrival at General McClellan's headquarters, I 
' was informed that he was sending his cavalry 
' back to the river, because it was impossible for 



10 
O 



' him to transport forage to sustain them. As 
« an evidence of the condition of the roads from 

* Ship Point to his headquarters, I was myself 
' eight hours going seven miles on horseback." 

This testimony is so important that I have 
deemed it absolutely requisite that the country 
should have it. The country has been deceiv- 
ed. It has been led to believe that the Secre- 
tary of War or somebody else has interfered 
with General McClellan's plans, when he had 
an army that could have crushed any other 
army on the face of the earth. One hundred 
and fifiyei;?ht thousand of the best troops that 
ever stood on God's footstool were sent down 
to the peninsula and placed under the com- 
mand of General McCIellan ; and yet the whole 
treasonable press of the country has been howl- 
ing after the Secretary of War because of his 
alleged refusal to send reinforcements to Gen 
eral McCIellan. As I said the other day, he 
has sent every man, every sabre, every bayonet, 
every horse, that could be spared from any 
source whatever, to increase that grand army 
under General McCIellan in front of Richmond. 
Why did he not enter Richmond ? We shall 
see. General McDowell's force was not sent 
down because it was deemed necessary to pro- 
tect the capital and its vast accumulation of 
military stores. Although the President and 
Secretary of War would have been justified in 
holding the whole of that force, General Frank- 
lin's division was taken from it and shipped to 
the peninsula at General McClellan's most ur- 
gent solicitation, and it was his urgent cry for 
reinforcements that brought Shields down to 
unite with McDowell ; and thus united, those 
two columns were to march upon Richmond 
and still further reinforce and aid General Mc- 
CIellan. As to the manner in which General 
McCIellan has been treated by the War Depart- 
ment, I will present the testimony of the Quar- 
termaster General. General M. C. Meigs tes- 
tifies as follows, among other things : 

" Question. Will you give, if you have no ob- 
' jection, an approximate estimate of the number 
' of troops sent to General McCIellan before the 
' late battles near Richmond? 

" Answer. In doing so, I shall have also to give 
' the grounds for my opinion. I was called upon 
' to provide transportation for about one hundred 

* and ten thousand men, with their artilery, 
' horses, baggage, provisions, &c. I am informed 
' by Mr. Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, who 
' negotiated the most of the charters of vessels 

* at the first starting, that he made up an esti- 
' mate just after they sailed, by which it appeared 
' that about one hundred and twenty-three tliou- 

* sand men, I think ; two hundred and seventeen 
' thousand horses; eighteen hundred wagons; 
' and forty-four batteries of artillery, had been 
' shipped for the peninsula. I do not understand 

* that Franklin's division was included in that 
' enumeration. Since then, Franklin's division, 
' which must have been ten or twelve thousand 



strong, and McCall's division, nearly eleven 
thousand strong, have been sent down there. 
Certain troops have been obtained from For- 
tress Mom'oe and Norfolk, being drilled troops, 
and replaced by newer ones from here, Balti- 
more, and elsewhere. The number of those I 
could hardly guess at. I should suppose the}-- 
were about eight or ten thousand men; and 
about eleven thousand men since these late 
battles have been sent from Alexandria; they 
W"ere a part of Shields's division, and some 
regiments that were taken from here. I have 
estimated roughly that that would make a total 
of about one hundred and sixty thousand men, 
from first to last, transported to the peninsula. 
We have sent more wagons since — a considera- 
ble number; and General Van Vliet, who was 
here the other day, and was chief quartermas- 
ter of the peninsula, told me that there were 
about three thousand wagons now in camp at 
Harrison's Point. We have sent horses down, 
from time to time, to replace those that died or 
were broken down and killed. 

" Question. Have you had the means of know- 
ing whether the Government has had it in its 
power to send more reinforcements to General 
McCIellan than it has since his landing on the 
peninsula ? 

" Answe?: I do not think the Government could 
have safely sent, from any troops within its reach 
here, any considerable reinforcements to Gen- 
eral McCIellan beyond what it has already sent. 
A few hundred men, more or less, would amount 
to nothing. The only way, it appeal's to me, in 
which the Government could have done so, was 
to have called for more troops, raised them, or- 
ganized them, drilled them, and made them fit 
to go there; for raw troops are of no use." 

-H--X--M--X--X-*-»-5«- 

*' Question. Will you state to the committee if, 
' in your estimation, everything required by Gen- 
' eral McCIellan of the Government has been 
' promptly sent to him ? 

" Ansicer. I think so. I know the Government 
' has desired to do it. In my own department, 
' have endeavored to supply everything called 
' for; and I have no doubt that has been done in 
' all the other departments." 

I present this testimony now partly because 
we have not yet had an answer to the resolution 
of the Senate asking for information as to the 
number of men shipped to the peninsula. It 
is not for me, sir, to state the strength of Mc- 
Clellan's army at this time ; but I know it is 
one hundred and fifty-eight thousand men, less 
the number lost by sickness and casualties. 
Does any man doubt that this army, ably 
handled, was sufBciently strong to have cap- 
tured Richmond and crushed the rebel army ? 
I think not, if promptly led against the enemy. 
But instead of that, it sat down in malarious 
swamps, and awaited the drafting, arming, 
drilling, and making soldiers of an army to 
fight it, and in the mean time our own army was 
rapidly wasting away. Unwholesome water, 



14 



inadequate food, overwork, and sleeping in 
marshes, were rapidly filling the hospitals, and 
overloading the return boats with the sick. 
Sir, we have lost more men by the spade than 
the bullet — five to one since the army started 
from Yorktown under McClellan. Had the 
soldiers been relieved from digging and menial 
labor by the substitution of negro laborers, the 
army of the Potomac would to-day, in my esti- 
mation, contain thirty thousand more brave and 
efficient soldiers than it does. Had it been re- 
lieved from guarding the property of rebels in 
arms, many valuable lives would have been 
saved. Yorktown was evacuated after a sacri- 
fice of more men by sickness than the enemy 
had in their works when our army landed at 
Fortress Monroe. The battle of Williamsburg 
was fought by a small fraction of our army, and 
the enemy routed. During the battle. General 
McClellan wrote the following dispatch, miles 
from the field of battle : 

(Roceivecl at War Department, at 12.22 p. m., May 6.) 

Bivouac in Front op Williamsburg, 
May 5, 10 p. m. 
Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War : 

After arranging for the movements up the 
York river, I was urgently sent for here. I find 
Joe Johnson in front of me in strong force, prob- 
ably greater a good deal than my own. Han- 
cock has taken two redoubts and repulsed Early's 
brigade by area! charge with the bayonet, taking 
one colonel and a hundred and fifty pi'isoners, 
killing at least two colonels and many privates. 
His conduct was brilliant in the extreme. I do 
not know our exact loss, but 'fear Hooker has 
lost considerably on our left. I learn from pris- 
oners that they intend disputing every step to 
Richmond. I shall run the risk of at least hold- 
ing them in check here, while I resume the origi- 
nal plan. 

My entire force is undoubtedly considerably 
inferior to that of the rebels, who will fight well ; 
but I will do all I can with the force at my dis- 
posal. 

G. B. McCLELLAN, 
Major General Commanding. 

He would try to " hold them in check I" ^He 
could not hold them. He could not stop his 
eager troops from chasing them. After a small 
fraction of his army had whipped their entire 
force and been chasing them for hours, he pen- 
ned that dispatch and sent it to the Secretary 
of War; and, if I remember aright, it was read 
in one of the two Houses of Congress. As you 
may suppose from that dispatch, there was no 
great eagerness in following up that victory. 
Three Michigan regiments were not only deci- 
mated, they were divided in twain, in that bloody 
battle at Williamsburg. They fought there all 
day without reinforcements. One Michigan 
regiment went into the trenches and left sixty- 
three dead rebels, killed by the bayonet, welter- 
ing in their blood. But who has ever heard, 



from any official communication of the head of 
the army, that a Michigan regiment was in the 
fight at Williamsburg? I do not blame hira 
for giving credit where credit is due, for I do 
not believe he knew anything more of that fight 
than you or I. 

When that battle was fought and won, all the 
enemy's works were cleared away, and we had 
an open road to Richmond. There was not a 
single fortification between Richmond and Wil- 
liamsburg. All we had to do was to get through 
those infernal swamps, march up, and take pos- 
session of Richmond; What did we do? We 
found the worst swamp there was between Rich- 
mond and Williamsburg, and sat right down in 
the centre of it and went to digging. We sac- 
rificed thousands and tens of thousands of the 
bravest troops that ever stood on the face of 
God's earth, digging in front of no intrench- 
menta, and before a whipped army of the ene- 
my. We waited for them to recruit; we waited 
for them to get another army. They had a 
levy en masse. They were taking all the men 
and boys between the ages of fifteen and fifty- 
five, and magnanimously we waited weeks and 
weeks and weeks for them to bring these forced 
levies into some sort of consistency as an army. 
The battle of Fair Oaks was fought. There the 
enemy found again a little fraction of an army, 
very much less than half, and they brought out 
their entire force. I have it from the best au- 
thority that they had not a solitary regiment in 
or about Richmond that was fit to be put in 
front of an enemy that they did not bring to 
Fair Oaks and hurl upon our decimated army. 
Again the indomitable bravery of our troops, 
(of the men, of the private soldiers, the indom- 
itable energy of Michigan men and New Jer- 
sey men — but I will not particularize, for all 
the troops fought like lions,) and the ii:^hting 
capacity of our army, not only saved it from 
being utterly destroyed by an overwhelming 
force, but gave us a triumphant victory. The 
enemy went back to Richmond pell mell. I 
have been informed by a man who was there at 
the time, that two brigades of fresh troops could 
have chased the whole Confederate army through 
the city of Richmond and into the James river, 
so utter was their rout and confusion. 

And what did we do then ? We found an- 
other big swamp, and we sat down in the centre 
of it, and went to digging. We began to throw 
up intrenchments when there were no intreuch- 
ments in our front, no enemy that was not ut- 
terly broken. We never took advantage of the 
battle of Fair Oaks. Again Michigan soldiers 
were cut to pieces by hundreds. Go into the 
Judiciary square hospital in this city, and you 
will find more than half the occupants are 
Michigan men who were shot at Fair Oaks and 
Williamsburg, men who stood until a regiment 
of a thousand men was reduced to one hun- 
dred and five, and even then did not run. Sir, 
these men have been sacrificed, uselessly sac- 



15 



rificed. They have been put to hard digging, 
and hard fare, and hard sleeping, and if there 
was any hard fighting to do they have been put 
to that ; and, besides all this, at night they 
have had to guard the property of rebels in 
arms. They have been so sacrified that two or 
three of the Michigan regiments to-day cannot 
bring into the field two hundred and fifty men 
each out of a thousand with which they started. 

Fair Oaks was lost; that is to say, we won a 
brilliant victory, but it did us no good. We did 
not take advantage of it. Of course it would 
have been very unfair to take advantage of a 
routed army ; [laughter.] It would not have 
been according to our " strategy." We mag- 
nanimously stopped, and commenced digging. 
There was no army in our front : there were no 
entrenchments in our front; but we did not 
know what else to do, and so we began to dig 
and ditch, and we kept digging and ditching 
until the rebels had impressed and drilled and 
armed and made soldiers of their entire popu- 
lation. But that was not enough ; they sent 
Jackson up on his raid to Winchester, and we 
waited for him to come back with his twenty 
or thirty thousand men. We heard that Corinth 
was being evacuated, and of course it would 
have been very unfair to commence an attack 
until they brought their troops from Corinth ; 
and so we waited for the army at Corinth to 
get to Richmond. After the rebels had got all 
the troops they ever hoped to raise from any 
source, we did not attack them, but they at- 
tacked us, as we had reason to suppose they 
would. They attacked our right wing, and, 
as I am informed upon what I must deem re 
liable authority, they hurled the majority of 
their entire force upon our right wing of thirty 
thousand men, and during the whole of that 
Thursday our right wing of thirty thousand 
men held their ground, and repulsed that vast 
horde of the enemy over and over again, and 
held their ground at night. Of course you will 
say a reinforcement of twenty or thirty thou 
sand men was sent to these brave troops that 
they might not only hold their ground the next 
day, but send this dastardly army into Rich- 
mond a second time, as at Fair Oaks. No, sir ; 
nothing of the sort was done. 

At night, instead of sending them reinforce- 
ments, they were ordered to retreat. That was 
"strategy." The moment they commenced 
their retreat, as is said in the dispatches, the 
enemy fought like demons. Of course they 
would. Who ever heard of a retreating array 
that was not pursued by the victors like de- 
mons, except in the case of rebel retreats ? No 
other nation but ours was ever guilty of slopping 
immediately after a victory. Other armies 
fight like demons .ifter a victory, and annihi- 
late an enemy, but we do not. Our left wing 
and centre remained intact. A feint was made 
upon the left and centre, and I have here, not 
the sworn testimony, but the statement of one 



of the bravest men in the whole army oi the 
Potomac — I will not give his name, but a morf 
highly honorable man lives not — that when 
his regiment was ordered under arms, he had 
no doubt that he was going to march into Rich- 
mond. He believed the whole force of the 
enemy had attacked our right wing ; he be- 
lieved there was nothing but a screeu of pick- 
ets in front ; and he thought that now our 
great triumph was to come off. His men sprang 
into line with avidity, prepared to rush into 
Richmond and take it at the point of the bay- 
onet. He never discovered his error until he 
saw half a million dollars' worth of property 
burned right in front of his regiment, and then 
he began to think that an advance upon Rich- 
mond was not intended. And it was not. We 
had been at work there and had lost ten thou- 
sand men in digging intrenchnients ; we had 
spent months in bringing up siege guns, and 
we abandoned those intrenchments without 
firing one gun. Our army was ordered to ad- 
vance on the gunboats instead of ou Rich- 
mond. This colonel told me that his regiment 
fought three days and whipped the enemy each 
day, and retreated each night. The left wing 
aud centre were untouched until they were or- 
dered to retreat. No portion of our vast force 
had been fought except the right wing under 
Porter, and they whipped the enemy the first 
day. _ 

This is called strategy I Again, sir, I ask 
why was this great army of the Potomac of 
two hundred and thirty thousand men divided ? 
Human ingenuity could not have devised any 
other way to defeat that army ; divine wisdom 
could scarcely have devised any other way to 
defeat it than that which was adopted. There 
is no army in Europe to-day that could meet 
the army of the Potomac when it was two hun- 
dred and thirty thousand strong, the best fight- 
ing material ever put into an army on the face 
of the earth. Why was that grand army divi- 
ded ? I simply charge that grave and serious 
errors have been committed, and, as I have 
said, no other way could have been devised to 
defeat that army. If the one hundred and fifty- 
eight thousand men that were sent to General 
McClellan had been marched upon the enemy, 
they could have whipped all the armies the con- 
federates have, and all they are likely to have 
for six months. One hundred and fifty-eight 
thousand are about as many as can be fought 
in any one battle-field. One hundred and fifty- 
eight thousand men are a vast army, a great 
deal larger army than that with which Napo- 
leon destroyed six hundred thousand of ...e 
Austrians in a single year. One hundred auc? 
fifty-eight thousand men, ably handled, f^au -de- 
feat any force the confederates can nn • ind 
that is the force that went down io v •- ;"nin- 
sula. But, sir, it was divided; ani •':- .^ it lay 
in ditches, digging, drinking rot! on , y,ter, and 
eating bad food, and sleeping in it mud, until 



/^"\ 



16 



it became greatly reduced in numbers, and of 
those that were left very many were injured in 
health. Still they fight; still they conquered 
in every fight; and still they retreated, because 
they were ordered to retreat. 

Sir, I have deemed it my duty to present this 
statement of facts to the Senate and the coun- 
try. I know that I am to be denounced for so 
doing, and I tell you who will denounce me. 
There are two classes of men who are sure to 
denounce me, and no one else, and they are 
traitors and fools. The traitors have been de- 
nouncing every man who did not sing paeans 



to " strategy," when it led to defeat every time. 
The traitors North are worse than the traitors 
South ; and sometimes I think we have as many 
of them in the aggregate. They are meaner 
men ; they are men who will come behind you 
and cut your throat in the dark. I have great 
respect for southern traitors who shoulder their 
muskets and come out and take the chances of 
the bullet and the halter; but I have the most 
superlative contempt for the northern traitors, 
who, under the pretended guise of patriotism, 
are stabbing their country in the dark. 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 
SCAMMELL & CO., PRINTERS, COR. SECOND & IND. AVENUE, THIRD FLOOR. 

1862. 



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pennulipe* 
pH8J 



